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Abstract
Since the 1980s, privatization of formerly state-owned firms has been extensively imple-
mented by governments across Latin America. Despite the fact that most evaluations of the
process fail to find significant adverse welfare effects, there has been a strong surge in public
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sis of the determinants of such discontent with privatizations in Latin America, using survey
data from Latinobarometro covering 18 countries over the period 1995-2005, complemented
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1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, privatization of formerly state-owned firms has been extensively implemented by
governments across Latin America, with most of the proceeds being generated in infrastructure
sectors (water, transport, energy and telecommunications).1 As a matter of fact, the World
Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database shows that for the period 1990 to 2004,
Latin America and the Caribbean has been the leading region in the world in terms of number of
projects (1062 of a total of 2976) and investment figures (US$ 392 bn. of a total of US$ 871 bn.).2
At the country level, five Latin American countries feature in the top ten ranking by number
of projects (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Colombia), and three in terms of aggregate
investment (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico). Within the region itself, there are also significant
variations across countries, from the very active ones like Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina and
El Salvador in which accumulated proceeds as of 1999 ranged between 8 and 20% of GDP, to
laggards like Uruguay, Paraguay, Costa Rica and Ecuador, in which virtually no privatizations
took place.3
Given the scale of the privatization wave, evaluating this process has become an important
challenge both for practitioners and scholars. Actually, a number of researchers have already
undertaken this difficult task focusing on several important aspects of the process, including its
macroeconomic impact, firm- and sector-level efficiency, employment, specific social outcomes
like health, income distribution, poverty and welfare.4 To date, most studies found neutral
to positive effects, with the possible exception of specific cases of price increase and layoffs in
privatized firms. However, in recent years, opinion surveys from Latin America have revealed a
profound and growing dissatisfaction with privatization, a situation that has already created a
backlash against this policy, including popular protests, riots and governments in some countries
making or being elected on pledges for a return to state-provided public services.5 Understanding
this contrast between the generally positive economic evaluations and the striking evolution of
negative public opinions on the privatization process therefore constitutes quite of a challenge
both for policy-makers and researchers.
The objective of this paper is to perform a systematic empirical analysis of the causes of public
discontent with privatization in Latin America, using over 100,000 survey data observations from
Latinobarometro covering 18 countries over the period 1995-2005, complemented by country
level data on macroeconomic, political, and institutional aspects as well as data on the extent of
privatization. The joint use of those two sources of data is made necessary because the causes
1See Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004, Chapter 2).
2Note, however, that these investment figures must be taken with some caution, as they represent commitments
rather than actual spending.
3Lora and Panizza (2002).
4See Martimort and Straub (2005 and 2008) for a more detailed discussion and references.
5The cases of Argentina and Bolivia are in order.
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of public discontent is expected to be linked both to individual aspects (income, asset holdings,
employment and social status, education, beliefs) but also to other “environmental” factors
(size of the privatized sectors, phases in the economic cycle, institutional quality). We unveil
the mechanisms behind the observed determinants found to be significant. More precisely, we
ask whether the growing dissatisfaction simply results of a standard assessment of the effect of
privatization on a combination of individual and group level welfare, or whether it rather comes
from an important shift in beliefs regarding the appropriateness of this policy.
As for the first aspect, we consider each individual’s assessment of the privatization benefits
to be based on an estimation of the variation in some welfare indicator, formed by the weighted
sum of the perceived welfare of a number of groups in the country of the respondent, induced by
privatization over a certain time period. In such a general framework, variations in the weights
attributed to each group can yield individual answers that rely on anything from purely selfish
motives to completely altruistic ones, as well as capture considerations that have already been
discussed in the literature, like, among others, fairness concerns, concerns for one’s (or one’s
group) relative position in society, and experienced vs. revealed utility that is sensitive to the
timing of economic effects.6 We provide evidence on how the expressed level of dissatisfaction
differs by level of income, education and along other socioeconomic divides, and to what extent
it reflects relative income considerations.7
As far as beliefs are concerned, recent contributions have highlighted the crucial role of
beliefs in the expression of opinions on policy or social issues, both at the theoretical and at the
empirical level.8 Using an interesting natural experiment in Argentina, Di Tella, Schargrodsky
and Galiani (2007) show for instance that a simple change in land tenure status can induce
important changes in individual pro-market beliefs even in the absence of any significant welfare
change. It is therefore possible that such changes in beliefs are responsible for changes in
satisfaction with specific reforms, above and beyond any welfare impact of such policies. It has
been an open question to determine whether the rise in discontent with privatization in Latin
America was due to a more general shift in beliefs against free-market policies or to some type
of “reform fatigue” that would alter the support for what is perceived to be a liberal policy
agenda.9 We provide specific insights about the extent to which such changes in beliefs can be
held responsible for this attitude.
In a nutshell, we find that dissatisfaction can be explained by a mix of individual character-
istics that point to categories of individuals who have suffered or benefited less than others from
privatizations, and of beliefs on several aspects. As for characteristics, the effect of education,
6See among others Senik (2004), Ravaillon and Lokshin (2001) and Kahneman and Thaler (1991).
7Note that, since the implicit weights used by individuals are unobserved, the use of subjective survey data
raises issues relative to the interpretation of individual answers. See Clark et al. (2005), Ravaillon and Lokshin
(2000) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). These issues are discussed in the body of the paper.
8Piketty (1995), Di Tella and McCulloch (2004), Benabou and Tirole (2006).
9Panizza and Yañez (2006), Lora and Olivera (2005).
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socioeconomic variables and assets variables signal a rather robust U-shaped effect in term of
education and income levels, with individuals in the middle of such distributions being more
critical with the outcome of privatizations. While the nature of our data does not allow us
to systematically distinguish pure welfare effects from relative income concerns, that could for
instance be linked to an unequal distribution of gains across social classes, we indicate in the
discussion of the results why and when it is likely that both aspects are at play.10
A similar mix of absolute and relative income effects helps understand the outcome in terms
of employment status, with public sector employees, unemployed and home workers categories
corresponding to lower satisfaction levels, and private sector employees and students to higher
approval rates. Indeed, a combination of direct welfare losses for some categories (public sector
employees, unemployed) and informational effects (to the extent for example that privatization
signals a shift toward more competitive job market practices) for others, seems relevant.
Moreover, beliefs also matter, and the respondents’ assessments of privatization is strongly
correlated with their views on the economic situation, their political preferences and the level
of trust in society. Individuals forming more pessimistic evaluations of the economic situation
are also less satisfied with privatizations, but so are those placing themselves more to the right
of the political spectrum and having more pronounced preferences for democracy and a higher
level of trust in others. Using pseudo panel fixed effects and instrumental variable estimations,
we offer preliminary evidence that most of the individual beliefs effects go through differences
in expectations with the outcome of economic policies, as well as with the overall transparency
and fairness of the process.
A number of explanations have already been put forward in the policy literature to under-
stand the current dissatisfaction trend with privatizations in Latin America.11 We may classify
these contributions into three categories:
• Welfare considerations: A first line of research has tried to assess the impact of priva-
tizations on prices, quality of the services and employment, on the welfare of different groups
and therefore on the evolution of satisfaction. Recent research (e.g. McKenzie and Mookher-
jee, 2003; Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2005) seems to indicate that such effects were mostly
positive, except in very few cases. These works raise the question of whether some negative
effects of privatization were not picked by these studies. In this respect, some partial evidence
can be found regarding deteriorating quality, or improvements in quality which are not enough
to compensate for price increases, in particular when price cap regulation has been used.12 Job
losses and the deteriorating quality of working conditions (longer hours worked, lower job secu-
rity and social benefits) are other important channels through which real welfare losses might
10See Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) for a theoretical approach to this issue, and Senik (2004) for empirical
evidence using Russian data.
11Martimort and Straub (2008) provide a detailed discussion of the aspects mentioned below.
12McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003), Estache, Guasch and Trujillo (2003), Nellis, Menezes and Lucas (2004).
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have materialized for some subsets of the population.13
• Macroeconomic landscape: The impact of the business cycle, including the possible dis-
ruptive effect of large macroeconomics shocks, devaluations, etc., has sometimes been deemed
responsible for the waning support for pro-market reforms (e.g. by Lora Panizza and Yañez,
2006). However, the direct impact of privatizations on the business cycle remains unclear, with
opinions ranging from those attributing the rise in economic instability to privatizations, to
more positive ones considering that they contributed to limit the effect of external shocks. It
is therefore difficult to assess whether the correlation between the fall in economic activity and
dissatisfaction with privatizations is due to a direct negative welfare impact, to a gap between ac-
tual and expected performances, or to a change in beliefs somehow linked to the evolution of the
overall economic situation. Answering this question would require making assumptions on the
macroeconomic effects of privatizations and on the structure of errors in individual judgements
that are bound to be speculative.
• Political economy: Finally, a last trend of the literature has tried to link the negative ap-
praisal of privatization to distributional concerns. The basic idea is that, although privatization
might come with efficiency gains, the effects of projects renegotiations and cancellation14, cor-
ruption, and the lack of transparency of the process introduce distributional concerns among
groups. Martimort and Straub (2008) offer a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails
in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of public service providers. Privati-
zation, even though it fosters investments in infrastructure, might also open the door to more
corruption. The public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by changes
in the degree and pattern of corruption, as the public perception and awareness are modified
when corruption changes in nature. Indeed, corrupt activities mainly consist of siphoning public
budgets under public ownership whereas they amount to raising regulated prices under private
ownership. Martimort and Straub (2008) model thus helps understand the fact that popular dis-
satisfaction with the process is especially high among middle class consumers, who bear the bulk
of the cost generated by corrupt deals after privatizations, and therefore perceive themselves as
the big losers in the allocation of efficiency gains.
In an empirical paper using only three waves of the Latinobarometro surveys, Checchi et
al. (2006) find that disagreement with privatization is most likely when the respondent is poor,
privatization was massive and quick, involved a high proportion of public services as water
and electricity, and in countries where there is high inequality of income. A robust non-linear
relationship between socioeconomic status and dissatisfaction with privatization suggests, in
particular that middle-to-low income households, with a median level of nine years of education,
perceive to have suffered from privatization. This result is again broadly consistent with recent
13McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003), López-Calva and Rosellón (2002).
14See Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2008).
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empirical research in Latin America that points to distributional concerns in the implementation
of privatization policy because the consequences of the corresponding changes in tariffs were not
adequately addressed by policy-makers and regulators.
However, it must be noticed that the findings in these papers may also be consistent with an
alternative story in which an increase in the perception of corruption, or more generally of some
unfair distribution of the gains from privatizations, may undermine trust in market reforms and
induce a shift in beliefs, as conjectured for example by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004), who
argue that observing corruption causes people to become more left-wing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data we are using. Section 3
introduces the basic econometric models, including estimations on individual data, aggregate
data and pseudo panel fixed effects. Section 4 addresses specifically the issue of beliefs, and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Latinobarometro provides a series of yearly household surveys since 1995. Each year, a rep-
resentative panel of individuals is asked a list of questions. Individuals are not re-interviewed
every year and the data are more like a rotating representative panel. Data are available for
the period 1995 to 2005, except 1999 when the survey was not carried out, with coverage rising
to 18 Latin American countries after 1996. For each country, there are approximately between
600 and more than 1000 respondents. This means a total of over 100,000 observations, across
18 countries and 10 years.
The survey includes one question about the level of satisfaction with services that have been
privatized. It was asked each year (with some variations) between 1998 and 2005, but does not
differentiate by sectors. There is a question differentiating by sectors, but it was only asked in
1995 and 98. We use the only question that has sufficient intertemporal coverage (1998 to 2005,
except 2004). It asks respondents to indicate whether they strongly agree / agree / disagree /
strongly disagree with the statement that privatizations have been beneficial to the country.
Additionally, the survey contains a full set of individual characteristics: demographics, as-
sets, access to public services. It also contains answers to a host of subjective questions capturing
individual opinions on several aspects like democracy, institutions, laws, politics, citizen partici-
pation, public policies, poverty, other socioeconomic subjects, international relations and general
values. However, because there have been frequent changes in the layout of the survey, many
of these questions are not available across a sufficient number of time periods and cannot be
exploited empirically.
The Latinobarometro data from successive years were stacked together and then merged
with country level data from a variety of sources. This includes data from the World Bank
PPI database on the amount of privatization proceeds by country and sectors from 1988 to
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2003, aggregate governance Indicators for 1996-2004 from the Political Risk Service’s Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide (1984-2004), democracy and autocracy indicators from the Polity 4
database, and generic country level data from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
Details about the sources and descriptive statistics are in the Appendix.
3 Econometric Models and Empirical Results
Figure 1 represents the evolution of the percentage of respondents in each country that (strongly)
agree with the fact that privatizations have been beneficial to the country.
Figure 1
The graph confirms the sharp decrease of the average satisfaction with privatization from
1998 to 2005 with a peak of dissatisfaction around the years 2002-2003.
In what follows, we use different methods to test the determinants of satisfaction or dis-
satisfaction with privatization, given the household survey data available and the aggregate
country-year information, starting with simple individual data.
3.1 Methodology and Results Using the Individual Data
Denoting by yict the opinion about privatization of individual i in country c at year t, and Xict
the vector of his characteristics, γct a country-year fixed effect representing the fixed component
across individuals that affects the opinion about privatization in country c at year t (as for
example the average influence of a media campaign), and εict an unobserved individual deviation
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of individual opinion on privatization, we assume that the individual opinion is determined by
the following equation:
yict = X
0
ictβct + γct + εict. (1)
Without loss of generality, we can also assume that γct is determined by observed country-year
characteristics Sct and unobserved ones ηct such that
γct = S
0
ctδ + ηct.
Then we can also re-write
yict = X
0
ictβct + S
0
ctδ + ηct + εict. (2)
The individual survey opinion about privatization allows us to estimate the model at the indi-
vidual level and thus identify the parameters βct and γct from the first specification or βct, and
δ from the second one after assuming that E (ηct|Xict, Sct) = 0, in addition to the first necessary
assumption E (εict|Xict, Sct) = 0. If this assumption cannot be made, then one can estimate the
first specification and then, after estimating the country-year fixed effects γct, regress these ef-
fects on characteristics Sct of the country and period with only E (ηct|Sct) = 0. In what follows,
we present the results from both approaches.
Table 1 presents the estimation of model (2) on individual data when the dependent variable
is equal to 1 if the individual agrees (strongly) with the fact that privatizations have been benefi-
cial to the country and 0 if he/she disagrees (strongly). Assuming that the error term is normally
distributed, one can estimate such discrete choice model by maximum likelihood using the usual
probit model. The list of individual characteristics Xict, includes demographics (sex, age, mari-
tal status, education and occupation), wealth characteristics captured by asset ownership (TV,
fridge, computer, washing-machine, car, secondary house, tenancy status), and access to basic
services (drinking water, hot water, sewage).15 Finally, the country level characteristics Sct are
related to the macroeconomic environment16 (income per capita, lagged GDP growth), gover-
nance (corruption, quality of the bureaucracy), the political environment (a democracy index)
and the level of privatization proceeds. Finally, we also introduce individual opinion variables on
several aspects, including how people place themselves on a left-right political spectrum, trust in
law, in other members of society, and assessments of the present and future economic situation,
both at the personal and collective levels. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
(Table 1 here)
To summarize, Table 1 shows that women are less satisfied by privatizations as well as older
people, people living in couple, public sector employees, unemployed and students (although
15Telephone access could also be added to the list, but this variable is not available for 2005. Estimations not
shown here show that it is not significant when included.
16Lagged values are relevant since the surveys are typically carried out around the middle of the year.
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this last variable is not systematically significant). Moreover, there is a U -shaped relationship
between the degree of satisfaction and the level of education, meaning that the less satisfied with
privatizations are those with medium education.17 Actually, the effect of the education level and
its square imply that it is decreasing up to the education level 3 to 3.5, which is just below the
average of the distribution in the sample and corresponds to complete basic education or slightly
above.
Table 1 also shows that being richer, in the sense of holding certain assets (computer,
washing-machine, secondary house), corresponds to a higher level of satisfaction with priva-
tizations. These categories make up 17, 48, and 12% of the sample respectively, and can be
interpreted as representative of the top end in terms of income. A similar result holds for people
having access to hot water (43% of the sample). On the other hand, individuals who report
not having access to drinking water appear to be more satisfied on average than the rest of the
population. This is a relatively small subset (10%), likely to capture the very bottom of the
income distribution, i.e., individuals who might have gained, or expect to gain access to public
services through privatizations.
When opinion variables are introduced in column 5, they also appear to be correlated with
satisfaction about privatizations. For example, the more they are to the left in terms of political
preferences, and the less they trust other people in society, the less individuals are satisfied with
privatizations, while a higher level of trust in the judicial system corresponds to higher satisfac-
tion. Moreover, the more people perceive that the situation of the country has deteriorated, and
the more pessimistic they are about the future of the country, the less satisfied they are as well.
Note however that, although most of these results make intuitive sense, the inclusion of such
opinion variables on the right-hand side of the estimations is the source of specific econometric
problems that make the interpretation of the results difficult. We specifically address this issue
in Section 4 below.
(Table 2 here)
Finally, one can look at the effect of country level variables on satisfaction.18 First of all, the
level of income per capita is consistently negative, although not significant. Looking at the effect
of the economic cycle, higher growth in the year before the interview has a significant and positive
effect on satisfaction with privatizations, with each additional point implying between 2.6 and
3.3% higher satisfaction. The effect of the amount of accumulated proceeds from privatizations
17A similar pattern emerges when using the socioeconomic level of the respondent, ranging from 1 to 5, as
evaluated by the person carrying out the survey. This indicates that the less satisfied with privatizations are the
“middle class” people, with a reversal point around 3.5 (the average of this level in the sample is 2.8 and the
median is 3). We do not include this variable systematically in our estimations, however, because it is missing for
2002.
18Note that for some country-level variables 2005 values were missing, so their inclusion reduces the estimation
range to 1998-2003.
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is positive but statistically insignificant, so if anything it seems to be the case that individuals
in countries that have privatized more are more satisfied. The index of democracy also fails to
be significant.19
Concerning corruption, the results show that the more corruption there is in the country the
lower is the overall satisfaction with privatizations (variable statistically significant at the 10%
level in column 3), while the quality of the bureaucracy, when introduced as well, comes up with
the reversed sign, meaning that a better bureaucracy generates more dissatisfaction.
These estimations all include country fixed effects. When year fixed effects are introduced
as well, results in the Appendix Table A4 show that the only changes with respect to Table 1
are that per capita income now becomes positive and marginally significant in columns 3 and 5,
while lagged growth becomes negative and loses significance, and corruption becomes negative.
Hence, the time trend, which shows that satisfaction decreased significantly over the period with
a lower point in 2003, seems to pick up the negative evolution of the economy, as well as the
perception of misgovernance in the privatization process, previously captured by the growth and
corruption variables.20
One important concern might be that answers to the privatization question in fact capture
some general discontent with economic policies or the state of the economy for example. To
discard this possibility, we run similar estimations with alternative answers to opinion questions
as the dependent variable. Results available from the authors show that other opinion variables
do not exhibit the same correlations than the level of satisfaction with privatization. For example,
using the opinion about the country economic situation as the dependent variable in (1), we do
not find the same effects of asset ownership or education variables.
As mentioned above, in these specifications, the validity of the results from country-level
variables rests on the assumption that unobserved country-year characteristics are not sys-
tematically correlated with observed individual and aggregate aspects. Alternatively, one can
estimate model (1) and then regress the resulting country-year effects on country-level variables.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the γct across countries and years. These are estimated
from the model in column (1) of Table 1, where no country-level variables are introduced.
They represent the country-year effects on satisfaction that cannot be explained by individual
characteristics of respondents in Latinobarometro. There are variations across years within a
given country but also between countries. Indeed, for most countries, Figure 2 confirms the fact
19The GINI coefficient has been removed because it is missing for many years and anyway never significant in
any of these regressions.
20Assuming again normally distributed error terms, one can estimate model (2) using an ordered probit esti-
mation when the dependent variable is the ordered response about whether privatizations have been beneficial,
from disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (4). The results, available from the authors, confirm most of the
findings of the probit model. It is interesting to get the same results with either one model or the other because
it shows the robustness of the findings. In principle, the ordered probit model is more efficient than the probit
model, which uses less information about the respondents opinion on privatization, but the probit model is also
more robust to misclassification of respondents between agree and very agree or disagree and very disagree.
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that average satisfaction has decreased between 1998 and 2005 and also show that discontent
was the highest around 2003 and started to decrease in 2005.
Fig 2: Unexplained country-year effects (probit model)
Table 2 shows the regression of these country-year fixed effects on country level variables. The
country-year effects on satisfaction that cannot be explained by the individual characteristics
of the respondents are positively correlated with lagged growth, and negatively with proceeds
from privatization. The statistically significant results for lagged GDP growth indicate that the
economic cycle seems to be key in explaining residual country-year effects, while satisfaction
seems higher in countries that privatized less. Other variables fail to be significant.
(Table 2 here)
3.2 Methodology and Results Using Aggregate Data
The individual level equation however may suffer from measurement error problems in the de-
pendent variable yict of equation (2). Actually, adding measurement errors μict to the measured
yict gives the observed opinion byict
byict = yict + μict
= X 0ictβct + S
0
ctδ + ηct + μict + εict.
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If those measurement errors are correlated with individual characteristics Xict, then the co-
efficients are biased. However, averaging the observed data will then lead to cancel out the
measurement errors, whose average on a large sample of individuals will be approximately zero.
Assuming that
1
# {i ∈ c, t}
X
i∈c,t
μict = 0
implies therefore that it may be possible to identify the model parameters on the aggregate data.
Thus, given the initial equation for the individual opinion, the aggregate value for the opinion
defined by eyct = 1
# {i ∈ c, t}
X
i∈c,t
yict,
is such that eyct = eXctβct + S0ctδ + ηct + eεct, (3)
where eXct = 1
# {i ∈ c, t}
X
i∈c,t
Xict, and, eεct = 1
# {i ∈ c, t}
X
i∈c,t
εict.
Without restrictions on the unobserved ηct, one cannot identify the coefficients βct and δ. How-
ever, assuming that the unobserved country-year specific effects ηct are zero or are constant
along periods, that is ηct = ηc, one can use the longitudinal dimension of aggregate data and
identify βct and δ provided that E
³eεct|ηc, eXct, Sct´ = 0.
Remark that eyct then corresponds to a country-year average of the individual respondents
opinions. When considering the discrete answer between “agree” and “disagree” on whether
privatizations have been beneficial, the aggregate variable will then correspond to a percentage
of individuals who agree. Therefore, Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of (3) when
ηct = ηc.
Table 3 shows that when aggregating the data, most “individual” effects are unchanged,
although some are no longer significant or now have unstable signs, as for example in the case
of asset categories. This is not very surprising given that aggregation leads to substantial loss
of information along these dimensions.
Looking at variables that display a stable sign across the four specifications, statistically
significant effects are found for education and education squared as before, the share of private
employees and students (which both appear to boost satisfaction), TV, washing machine and
car ownership (whose means across countries are 87, 48 and 69% respectively), with people not
owning one being more satisfied, and the share of people not having access to hot water, which
is negatively correlated with satisfaction. An increase of 1% of this share reduces satisfaction
by between 0.23 and 0.43%. Based on this marginal effect, the 40% difference in access to hot
water between a country with poor infrastructure such as Bolivia and a more developed one
such as Chile would account for a difference in satisfaction with privatizations of between 10
12
and 17%. These variables seem therefore to capture the very bottom of the income distribution
for the former ones and the upper part of this distribution for the latter.
(Table 3 here)
Considering now country-level variables, we get positive correlations with the level of per
capita income and corruption, and negatives ones with lagged GDP growth and the proceeds
from privatizations. However, apart from per capita income in column 3 and 4, none of these
variables are statistically significant. Finally, the only significant opinion variable is “preference
for democracy”, which is positively correlated with satisfaction.
3.3 Pseudo-Panel Method and Results
The disadvantage of the previous models is that they do not take into account unobserved
individual preferences. A specific instance of that problem is the so-called “anchoring effect”,
which implies that individuals may be using different satisfaction scales and provide different
answers to characterize the same level of satisfaction.21 The lack of follow-up data on individuals
prevents for example the implementation of panel data models where one could take into account
unobserved individual fixed effects. However, one can construct a “pseudo panel” using the
observed characteristics of respondents to try to overcome such issues and test the robustness of
previous results (see for example, Attanasio and Weber, 1995, for the use of such method also
called “synthetic” panel).
Let us define an “average” individual representative of a set of characteristics Z such that
we can define K types based on these observed Z : i ∈ k if h (Zi) = k where h is a function
mapping individual with characteristics Z into a type space.
If the true model is
yict = X
0
ictβct + θi + γct + εict,
where θi is an unobserved individual fixed effect, then this model cannot be identified because
each household is observed only once.
However, if we assume that θi = θh(Zi) = eθk and define ykct = 1#{i/h(Zi)=k}Pi/h(Zi)=k yict,
21See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Senik (2004).
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then
ykct =
1
# {i/h(Zi) = k}
X
i/h(Zi)=k
yict,
=
1
# {i/h(Zi) = k}
X
i/h(Zi)=k
X 0ictβct +
1
# {i/h(Zi) = k}
X
i/h(Zi)=k
θi + γct
+
1
# {i/h(Zi) = k}
X
i/h(Zi)=k
εict
= X 0kctβct + eθk + γct + 1# {i/h(Zi) = k} X
i/h(Zi)=k
εict if X ⊂ Z,
= X 0kctβct + eθk + γct + ξkct,
where ξkct =
1
#{i/h(Zi)=k}
P
i/h(Zi)=k
εict.
Then, one can identify βct using the regression
ykct = X
0
kctβct + eθk + γct + ξkct, (4)
where ykct is the average response of type k individuals and eθk is the unobserved type k fixed
effect.
Table 4 presents the results of such estimation where the variables Z used to create the
pseudo panel are the country, the age category and sex. It yields 238 pseudo individuals, for
a total of 1176 observations across the 6 rounds of survey and 17 countries. Once the pseudo
panel has been created, one can use fixed effects linear regression to estimate (4). Year dummies
are also included.
Table 4 confirms some of the previous insights. As for the effect of education, we note that the
U -shaped relationship between satisfaction and the education level is preserved, meaning that the
less satisfied with privatizations are the people with medium education. Public employees and
unemployed are still more likely to be dissatisfied with privatizations. As for assets ownership,
we again observe that being rich in the sense of owning a car or a secondary house implies more
satisfaction, although the statistical significance of these variables is not very robust across
specifications. In terms of access to services, the results on people not having access to drinking
water and those having access to hot water being both more satisfied are also maintained. As
for country-level variables, income per capita and corruption yield rather unstable results, as in
the estimations including time fixed effects discussed previously.
(Table 4 here)
There are however also some noteworthy differences linked to the introduction of fixed effects.
First, being a home worker now appear to induce significantly more dissatisfaction, while being
a private sector employee or a student is now positively and significantly correlated to the
14
level of satisfaction. This change in the effect of employment status is interesting, because
it indicates that some of the effects picked up earlier, in particular the greater dissatisfaction
among unemployed individuals and students, were likely to be due to unobserved individual
preferences.
As for asset ownership, some categories partially lose significance (computer, car, secondary
house), while washing machine now turns negative and significant. Again, it appears that
unobserved effects were biasing the previous results on these variables.
Finally, results on some opinion variables are also modified, with people to the right being
now more dissatisfied, as well as people with weaker preferences for democracy and people with
lower levels of trust in others.
3.4 Summary and Discussion
To summarize the insights so far, we get the following picture with respect to traits and envi-
ronmental features that fuel dissatisfaction with privatizations. The analysis of individual data
indicates that women, older individuals and people living in couple are more dissatisfied. As for
employment status, dissatisfaction is more important among public employees, unemployed and
students. The first category is likely to capture the discontent from public employees who are
under the threat of being laid off or of seeing their job characteristics modified as the result of the
privatization process.22 Indeed, a number of studies show that there were substantial job losses
in privatized firms and, despite the fact that these cuts were generally small when compared to
the total workforce and tended to be partially reversed in the medium run, they also mention
serious workers’ concerns about the quality of their new jobs, including the obligation to work
longer hours and a degradation of health and social security benefits.23 This is compounded
by the well known fact that in many Latin American countries, public firms have been used
for patronage purpose by successive governments, with the result that many public employees
had relatively non-demanding jobs with benefits that largely exceeded what was available to the
population at large.
The dissatisfaction expressed by unemployed individuals could be related both to these job
losses, in case they were among the victims, and to worries about the conditions of possible
future employment. Finally, students may also be expressing preoccupations with the evolution
of the labor market. In general, it seems likely that the change in jobs characteristics induced
by the privatization of some big firms is taken by these categories of individuals, that are or
will soon be looking for a job, as a signal that the labor market and the reward structure has
become more competitive. In other words, the evaluation of privatization in this case seems to
be affected by people’s beliefs about what to expect from the economic situation rather than by
22Unfortunately, the surveys do not provide information on this aspect.
23McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003); López-Calva and Rosellón (2002); La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999).
See also the discussion in Martimort and Straub (2008).
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actual welfare changes directly induced by the policy. We return to this issue below.
Discontent is more pronounced among people with an intermediate level of education or with
intermediate socioeconomic levels, who can be interpreted as being middle class individuals. One
potential explanation is the one proposed by Martimort and Straub (2008), who argue that the
middle class perceives itself as being the main loser in the distribution of efficiency gains, partly
because of instances of corruption that have pushed up the price for public services.
In terms of assets, it appears that ownership of what can be considered as “luxury” assets
in a developing country context (computer, secondary house, and to a lesser extent car and
washing machine) corresponds to higher satisfaction with privatization. So is access to hot
water. At the other extreme, not having access to drinking water, a proxy for being in the
poorer part of the population, is also associated with greater satisfaction. Both facts can again
be related to the inverse U-shaped effect in terms of education and wealth, with higher level of
dissatisfaction in the middle of the distribution. The top part of the distribution, corresponds to
people that may actually have benefited from the change in the pattern of corruption mentioned
above, which went from affecting rich taxpayers, through the soft budget constraint of the
State, to falling mostly on service consumers through regulated prices. Moreover, they may
also have benefited from the elimination of cross-subsidies that followed the privatization of key
services like telecommunications and water. At the other end, very poor people, located in rural
communities or less developed urban areas previously unconnected to the networks, are likely to
have gained access to electricity, telecommunication or water after the change in ownership.24
This may explain their more positive evaluation of the benefits of privatizations.
At the aggregate level, dissatisfaction appears to strive in the context of poorer countries
experiencing a difficult macroeconomic situation. As a matter of fact, the strong negative time
trend between 1998 and 2005 (despite a slight reversal in 2005), seems to capture mainly the
effect of low economic growth. As for governance, corruption seems to fuel dissatisfaction, but
the results are not very robust, and those on bureaucratic quality are sometimes contradictory.
The introduction of fixed effect in the pseudo panel, needed to control for potential unob-
served effects, leads to refine some of these conclusions. First of all, the role of the employment
status is slightly altered, the main modification being that the categories that are significantly
less satisfied are now public employees, unemployed and home workers, while private sector
employees and students categories now appear positively correlated with satisfaction. One pos-
sibility is that private sector employees’ and students’ unobserved effects that lead them to
express dissatisfaction, for example the sensitivity to the labor market pro-competitive signaling
effect of privatization mentioned above or the greater ideological opposition to liberal policies
in general and privatization in particular, are now captured by the fixed effects.
24McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003), using data from Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua, show that
these categories often experienced substantial welfare gains.
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The U-shaped effect of education remains significant, and access to services variables indicate
that significant effects occur at the very ends of the distribution. On the other hand, most asset
ownership effects are weakened by the introduction of fixed effects. Again, one can conjecture
that ideological effects, likely to be stronger among middle class, urban groups, are now captured
by fixed effects.
Finally, when introduced in these estimations, some opinions on a range of social and political
aspects have intuitive effects. People expressing lower levels of trust in others and in the judicial
institution, and those considering that the country situation is worsening are more dissatisfied.
On the other hand, the role of left/right beliefs, preference for democracy and trust in others
is affected by the introduction of fixed effects, so it is difficult to draw a conclusion at that
stage. Indeed, as discussed in the Introduction, the use of such variables creates a number of
challenges, that are addressed in the next section.
4 The Role of Beliefs
A first look at a range of questions included in the Latinobarometro survey shows that the
evolution of opinions on the benefits of privatizations is closely paralleled by the evolution of
some other beliefs. Table 5 shows the correlation between the yearly country-level average
opinions on privatization and other opinion variables.25
Correlation Opinion variables with opinion on Privatization
Current country situation -0.3686*
Better country situation than before -0.2044*
Future country situation -0.0935
Law confidence -0.4226*
Trust 0.0180
Preference for Democracy -0.0311
Left/right position -0.0869
* Pairwise correlation significant at the 5% level
Table 5
Moreover, the evolution of these opinions in the period under study shows that at the time
respondents in Latin America expressed growing negative perceptions of privatization, they
also increasingly perceived the economic situation of their country to be bad, worse than 12
months ago, and they were also increasingly thinking this situation would worsen. Moreover,
the strongest correlation is found when comparing opinions on privatization with the level of trust
in the judicial system: People having lower levels of trust in this institution also express more
25The first four lines in this graph show the correlation between the rate of approval of privatizations and the
percentage of respondents that think that the country situation is bad/worse than 12 months ago/likely to worsen
and that the judicial system is not trustworthy. Hence, the negative correlations mean that more pessimistic
respondents on these aspects are less happy with privatizations.
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dissatisfaction with privatization. Finally, there was also some correlation with how people place
themselves on the political spectrum, more dissatisfaction with privatization being paralleled by
a movement to the right.
As signaled in Section 3, note that when estimations similar to those discussed previously
are run with these alternative opinions as dependent variables, a number of different results are
found, meaning that these opinions, although correlated, have distinct informational contents.
Overall, there seem to be a strong co-movement of opinion variables. This is especially true
for what we will call “superficial” opinions, i.e., those on short-term aspects, and a bit less so
for “deep” beliefs like the overall level of trust in others, the preference for democracy or the
situation on a left to right political spectrum. Finally, trust in the judicial system, which displays
the highest correlation with opinions on privatizations is to some extent a mix of deep beliefs
and more superficial opinions: although we would expect the level of trust in such institution to
be to some extent beyond considerations which are purely cyclical, it is also conceivable that it
may be subject to strong short-term fluctuations following for example some widely publicized
scandal in a given country. It is therefore important to address econometrically the challenges
posed by the inclusion of these variables, in order to provide the right interpretation of their
effects.
4.1 Econometric Strategy
The main problem is that the inclusion on the right-hand side of the estimations of additional
opinion variables might induce an endogeneity bias to the extent that both these variables and
the opinion on privatizations are correlated with some individual or group unobserved effects.
Unobserved effects would only be controlled for by the country dummies, as well as the fixed
effects in the pseudo panel setting, if they are time invariant. Year fixed effects may take
care of some time varying unobserved effects, but only if these are common across countries
and individuals. Any residual time varying individual unobserved effects would still induce a
correlation between opinion variables and the error term. Moreover, this endogeneity bias might
also affect the coefficients and standard errors of the other right-hand side variables included
in the estimations, such as the demographics, if, as is very likely, these variables are correlated
with the opinion variables through the unobserved individual or group effects.
An illustration of this is given by the strong correlation between opinions on privatizations
and short-term evaluations of the economic and social situation. At face value, it may indicate
that the state of the economy has a strong impact on the evaluation of privatizations’ benefits,
as argued in Panizza and Yañez (2006), and indeed we saw in the previous section that when
introduced in the estimations, opinions on the evolution of the economy were strongly signifi-
cant. However, to the extent that we control for general macroeconomic indicators, we should
expect these variables to stop being significant, which is not the case in most specifications.
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Alternatively, it may be the case that people form over-pessimistic beliefs about the state of the
economy, explaining the residual effect observed over and above the macroeconomic controls.
The question is then to determine whether all or part of the strongly significant effects that we
get are due to an unobserved effect bias, and to what extent this bias also affects the results of
other explanatory variables.
We start with the pseudo-panel defined above. This allows us to control for potential time
invariant unobserved effects. Additionally, at the end of this section, we experiment with an
alternative definition of the categories use to construct the pseudo panel, including some “deep
beliefs” aspects.
The problem of time-varying unobserved effects, and relatedly of possible measurement errors
in the opinion variables, requires the use of instruments. In the context of our data, it is difficult
to come up with some exogenous variables that would be correlated with specific beliefs but not
with the expressed satisfaction with privatizations. A plausible way to proceed is to use lagged
values of the beliefs themselves as instrumental variables, as we expect them to be correlated with
present opinions on privatizations only through their effect on actual beliefs. Additionally, we use
past values (1998) of a set of fundamental beliefs that we believe are likely to consistently indicate
the propensity to be more or less critical on issues like privatizations.26 The first one is peoples’
opinion on whether success depends on connections and on hard work respectively.27 Moreover,
recent work by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004 and 2005) shows that people’s perceptions on
aspects of their environment like crime, insecurity and corruption are also correlated with their
beliefs on economic issues like the appropriateness of pro market policies. Therefore, we also
use 1998 responses on a question asking whether people perceive that drug use and trafficking
has increased or not in the last five years.28
There is also some recent evidence on the possibility of exogenous shifts in beliefs arising
as the result of unexpected changes in the environment. Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky
(2007) show that the sudden allocation of property rights to squatters in the Buenos Aires
suburbs induced a dramatic change of beliefs in the value of work vs. connections in determining
individual success. While it is hard to identify exogenous events of this sort in relation with our
data, one implication is that the time dimension might matter, so we interact the beginning of
the period values of our instrumental beliefs with a complete set of time dummies. This allows us
to account for time-varying effects of these beliefs, through some key events of the environment,
on our endogenous variables.
To sum up, our empirical strategy is to estimate a fixed effect linear panel regression of the
26The political science literature offers examples of the use of past opinions or opinions in auxiliary data sets
to address the issue of values and opinions’ endogeneity. See for example Franklin (1989) and Zaller (1991).
27This question has been used in recent work as a proxy for the ideological orientation of different societies, as
discussed in Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Alesina et al. (2002) for example.
28A number of other related questions (perceptions on crime, corruption, level of interest in politics, etc.) have
been tested as instruments without significant improvements.
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form:
ykct = X
0
kctβct +B
0
kctδct + eθk + γct + ηkct, (5)
where ykct is the average response of type k individuals and eθk is the unobserved type k fixed
effect, using the pseudo panel setting developed above, and Bkct is the set of opinion variables
that we want to include. We estimate (5) using Bkct−1 and F 98kc × yt as instruments, where F 98kc
is a vector of beginning of the period “fundamental” beliefs and yt are year dummies.
4.2 Results
Table 6, columns 1 and 2, presents the results from such an estimation. When instrumented, the
opinion variables that remain significant are the evaluation of the present economic situation,
the evaluation of the future economic situation, the left-right index and the level of trust in
others. Marginal effects are quite important. For example, taking the opinions on the economic
situation in column 1, we can infer that a one point move up on the three level scale used to
assess the present economic situation (1=better, 2=equal, 3=worse), for example from equal
to worse, implies a 0.79 reduction on the scale used to assess the benefits from privatizations
(from very disagree that they have been beneficial=1 to very agree=4). Conversely, a one point
move up on the scale used to express expectations of the future economic situation (1=better,
2=equal, 3=worse) implies a 1.41 increase on the scale used to assess the benefits from priva-
tizations. Finally, a one point up on the left/right scale corresponds to a 0.09 point reduction
on the privatization benefit scale. The Sargan test of overidentification supports the validity of
instruments.
Most of these results are intuitive, except the left/right one. Indeed, standard ideological
arguments would lead to think that people that locate themselves on the left of the political spec-
trum would be more defiant of privatization, to the extent that it is identified with right-wing
pro market policies. One possibility is that our dependent variable in fact captures a quality
assessment of past privatizations, rather than an absolute judgement on the suitability of priva-
tizations. To that extent, holding right wing beliefs may be associated with higher expectations
with respect to the effect of privatizations, so people on the right may be expressing more dis-
satisfaction because they are disappointed with the way privatizations have been implemented
or with their outcome.
(Table 6 here)
The first conclusion is therefore that a number of beliefs matter in determining the support for
privatizations. Specifically, it appears that above and beyond their personal characteristics, their
occupation, their socioeconomic condition and the general country level situation, respondents’
opinions are affected by a mix of their evaluation of the current and future economic situation,
their level of trust in others, and their position on the political spectrum. Moreover, these
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effects are non trivial. They seem to involve first some informational aspects, to the extent
that for example a pessimistic evaluation of the economic cycle or lower trust in others induces
more dissatisfaction with privatization perhaps because people infer from the bad economic
results or the perceived misbehavior of others that previous policy choices were to some extent
misguided. However, there is also a presumption that the level of satisfaction expressed relates
to some extent to people’s evaluation of the performance of privatizations as compared to their
expectations of what these policies should have delivered, as argued on the interpretation of the
left/right variable above.
In column 3, we perform similar instrumental estimations with an alternative definition of
the pseudo panel representative individual, by introducing left/right as an additional variable in
the defining set of characteristics Z. This can be thought of as an attempt to control for fixed
unobserved characteristics linked to the ideological orientation of individuals, and in particular
for the expectation dimension mentioned above to explain the counterintuitive result on the
left/right variable. The pseudo panel now displays 2173 individuals, corresponding to 9598
observations.
Now, most beliefs become irrelevant. In particular, opinions on the present and future
economic situation are no longer significant. This indicates that, when controlling for unobserved
effects linked to the fact that different political beliefs create different level of expectations with
the outcome of policies and the aggregate macroeconomic evolution, short-term beliefs of this
sort have no effect. More precisely, the presumption is that a fraction of respondents shifted to
the right and had unobserved characteristics, probably revolving about their expectations with
economic policy, that made them both more likely to hold pessimistic opinions on the state of
the economy and to be defiant toward the outcome of privatizations. Thus, the “overshooting”
in beliefs observed here seems to be linked to different levels of expectation.
Overall, only the preference for democracy remain marginally significant in column 3. This
is likely to capture the extent to which individuals expressing stronger preferences may also
be expecting a more participatory and transparent policy making process. The fact that this
variable is still significant indicates that this dimension of individual characteristics is at least
partially orthogonal to political preferences and is thus imperfectly captured by the fixed effects
as defined here.
5 Conclusion
We have performed a systematic empirical analysis of the determinants of public discontent with
privatizations in Latin America, using survey data from Latinobarometro covering 18 countries
over the period 1995-2005, complemented by country level data on macroeconomic, political,
and institutional aspects as well as data on the extent of privatizations. The strong surge in
dissatisfaction in the region since the end of the 1990s appears to respond first to a mix of
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absolute and relative welfare effects. Specific categories that are likely to have suffered directly
from privatizations, such as unemployed and public sector employees, do indeed express more
dissatisfaction. As for relative effects, the fact that the extreme of the distribution in terms
of income or education are less dissatisfied is consistent with the middle class expressing con-
cerns about an unequal distribution of efficiency gains among the population, as put forward in
previous contributions on the subject.
Moreover, individual beliefs and expectations also appear to matter, above and beyond
the welfare effects mentioned above. We distinguish two channels through which beliefs affect
the expression of satisfaction with economic policy. They do so first through what we call
an information channel. Individuals forming pessimistic evaluations of the economic situation
or of the quality of trust in their society, infer from there that policy choices may have been
misguided or that they may reflect opportunistic behavior by policy makers. Second, opinions
on privatizations reflect different expectations with the outcome of this policy or with the way it
is conducted. This explains for example that individuals who place themselves more on the right
of the political spectrum are more dissatisfied than those on the left, a result that we interpret
as evidence that they have higher levels of expectations with this policy. The “overshooting” in
beliefs that occurs seems to reflect differences in expectations within the population.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data construction
Sources of data:
• Latinobarometro surveys 1995-2005
• Political risk variables (Bureaucracy quality, Corruption) from the International Country
Risk Guide, 1984-2004.
• World Bank Privatization Database, transactions by country, region or sector, by year
1988-2003 http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/
This site provides information on more than 9,000 privatization transactions in developing
countries from 1988 to 2003. Transactions by country, region or sector for a particular
time period or for the entire period are covered in the database.
• World Development Indicators, World Bank, 1960-2004.
• Democracy index from the Polity IV project (codes the authority characteristics of states
in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis).The Democracy
indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) taking into account the competitiveness
of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, the constraints on chief
executive, and the competitiveness of political participation.
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7.2 Descriptive statistics
Table A1
Individual variables Mean Median
Individual characteristics
Sex (0=woman, 1=man) 0.49 0
Age (years) 38.75 36
Couple (1=living in couple, 0=single) 0.57 1
Education level (1-9) 3.82 4
TV (0=no, 1=yes) 0.88 1
Fridge (0=no, 1=yes) 0.81 1
Computer (0=no, 1=yes) 0.17 0
Wash (0=no, 1=yes) 0.48 0
Car (0=no, 1=yes) 0.69 1
Secondary house (0=no, 1=yes) 0.12 0
Home owner (0=no, 1=yes) 0.74 1
Drink water (0=no, 1=yes) 0.90 1
Hot water (0=no, 1=yes) 0.43 0
Sewage system (0=no, 1=yes) 0.75 1
Opinion variables
Better situation (1=better,2=same,3=worse) 2.3 2
Future situation (1=better,2=same,3=worse) 2.08 2
Left Right (0-10 from left to right) 5.46 5
Law confidence (1=very high,2=high,3=low,4=very low) 2.91 3
Trust (0=no, 1=yes) 0.19 0
Democracy preference (-1=no,0=same,1=yes) 0.44 1
Table A2
Employment status Percentage
Employment status=1 (self employed) 29.5 %
Employment status=2 (public sector employee) 8.9%
Employment status=3 (private sector wage laborer) 17.2 %
Employment status=4 (temporarily unemployed) 6.8 %
Employment status=5 (retired) 7.0 %
Employment status=6 (at home) 21.5 %
Employment status=7 (student) 9.1 %
Whether privatization has been beneficial
agree strongly 8.64 %
agree 26.74 %
disagree 40.04 %
disagree strongly 24.58 %
Table A3
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Country level variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Political risk variables
Bureaucracy quality 1.87 2 0.673 0.16 3
Corruption 2.85 3 0.868 1 5
Other country level variables
GNI per capita 5296.1 4885 2387.75 1640 12460
GDP growth (%) 3.31 3.56 3.69 -11.03 17.32
Proceeds from privatizations (per year in 1000 $ US) 675.87 145.5 1355.31 0 9457
Democracy index 7.505 8 1.82 2 10
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Table A4. Probit estimations with individual data
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics
Sex -0.041 -0.049 -0.048 -0.027
(0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.015)*
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Couple -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.015)**
Education respondent -0.110 -0.092 -0.093 -0.089
(0.021)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** (0.029)***
Education respondent (sq) 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.011
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Employment status
Public sect. employee -0.075 -0.097 -0.090 -0.119
(0.023)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.022)***
Private sect. employee 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.016
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022)
Unemployed -0.061 -0.070 -0.075 -0.072
(0.022)*** (0.025)*** (0.024)*** (0.027)***
Retired 0.043 0.023 0.024 -0.015
(0.034) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
At home 0.021 0.011 0.011 -0.001
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Student -0.066 -0.067 -0.067 -0.095
(0.026)** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.030)***
Asset ownership
Tv -0.047 -0.035 -0.029 -0.058
(0.029) (0.037) (0.034) (0.044)
Fridge -0.011 -0.016 -0.012 0.017
(0.030) (0.042) (0.040) (0.049)
Computer 0.066 0.089 0.088 0.090
(0.016)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)***
Wash 0.054 0.048 0.053 0.059
(0.019)*** (0.026)* (0.024)** (0.020)***
Car 0.076 0.075 0.077 0.073
(0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.014)***
Secondary house 0.057 0.049 0.051 0.046
(0.015)*** (0.019)** (0.019)*** (0.018)**
Home owner 0.014 -0.000 -0.002 -0.015
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Access to services
Drinking water -0.092 -0.115 -0.112 -0.103
(0.024)*** (0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)***
Hot water 0.055 0.060 0.056 0.051
(0.021)*** (0.028)** (0.025)** (0.026)*
Sewage system -0.031 -0.030 -0.029 -0.009
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023)
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Table A4 - continued
Country level var.
GNI per capita 0.176 0.153 0.127
(0.070)** (0.059)*** (0.064)**
GDP growth -1 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Privat. proceeds (106) 14.39 18.24 9.16
(12.65) (15.22) (9.92)
Corruption -0.027 -0.039 -0.040
(0.051) (0.055) (0.047)
Bureaucratic quality -0.518
(0.089)***
Democracy index 0.000
(0.001)
Opinions variables
Better situation -0.108
(0.012)***
Future situation -0.089
(0.019)***
Left/right 0.023
(0.008)***
Law confidence -0.111
(0.011)***
Trust 0.151
(0.029)***
Democracy preference -0.039
(0.026)
Year 2000 -0.433
(0.003)***
Year 2001 -0.778
(0.003)***
Year 2002 -0.920
(0.002)***
Year 2003 -0.958
(0.005)***
Year 2005 -0.472
(0.005)***
year -0.150 -0.217 -0.147
(0.015)*** (0.024)*** (0.014)***
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes No No No
Country†year fixed effects Yes No No No
Observations 90289 70393 43887 47800
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the country level). Coefficients significant
at 10%: *; 5%: **; 1%: ***. Variables coding: See Table 1.
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Table 1. Probit estimations with individual data
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Demographics
Sex -0.037 -0.045 -0.044 -0.044 -0.022
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.014)
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)**
Couple -0.022 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.028
(0.011)** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.016)*
Education respondent -0.083 -0.079 -0.079 -0.079 -0.078
(0.027)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.029)***
Education respondent (sq) 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Employment status
Public sect. employee -0.077 -0.088 -0.084 -0.084 -0.113
(0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.023)***
Private sect. employee 0.020 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.021
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
Unemployed -0.082 -0.079 -0.080 -0.080 -0.084
(0.023)*** (0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)***
Retired 0.048 0.032 0.032 0.032 -0.011
(0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
At home 0.026 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.011
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
Student -0.033 -0.042 -0.041 -0.041 -0.073
(0.022) (0.023)* (0.024)* (0.024)* (0.028)***
Asset ownership
Tv -0.065 -0.039 -0.036 -0.036 -0.060
(0.031)** (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.041)
Fridge 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 —0.031
(0.033) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.050)
Computer 0.030 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.061
(0.024) (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)**
Wash 0.042 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.057
(0.024)* (0.026)* (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.019)***
Car 0.095 0.092 0.094 0.094 0.089
(0.015)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.017)***
Secondary house 0.059 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.051
(0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.017)***
Home owner 0.008 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Access to services
Drinking water -0.114 -0.121 -0.119 -0.119 -0.108
(0.029)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.032)***
Hot water 0.086 0.077 0.076 0.076 0.071
(0.030)*** (0.031)** (0.030)** (0.030)** (0.029)**
Sewage system -0.005 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 0.010
(0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
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Table 1-continued
Country level var.
GNI per capita -0.084 -0.096 -0.096 -0.129
(0.139) (0.143) (0.143) (0.123)
GDP growth -1 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.026
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)***
Privat. proceeds (106) 9.81 10.86 10.86 3.65
(17.91) (19.14) (19.14) (15.68)
Corruption 0.091 0.086 0.086 0.073
(0.051)* (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Bureaucratic quality -0.224 -0.224
(0.102)** (0.102)**
Democracy index -0.002 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)***
Opinions variables
Better situation -0.104
(0.017)***
Future situation -0.088
(0.019)***
Left/right 0.022
(0.008)**
Law confidence -0.131
(0.010)***
Trust 0.142
(0.024)***
Democracy preference -0.032
(0.028)
Constant -0.084 0.380 1.194 1.194 1.819
(0.093) (1.810) (2.026) (2.026) (1.586)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No No No
Observations 90289 70393 70393 70393 47800
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the country level). Coefficients significant at 10%: *;
5%: **; 1%: ***.
Variables coding. Demographics: sex (0=man, 1=women); age (years); couple (0=living in couple, 1=sin-
gle); education of respondent (1=illiterate; 2=basic incomplete; 3=basic complete; 4=secondary, medium,
technical incomplete; 5=Secondary, medium, technical complete; 6=superior incomplete; 7=superior
complete). Employment status: public sector employee/private sector employee/unemployed/retired/at
home/student (1=yes, 0=no). Asset ownership: tv/fridge/computer/wash machine/car/secondary house/home
owner (1=yes, 0=no). Access to services: drinking water/hot water/sewage system (1=yes, 0=no)
Country level variables: GNI per capita (in US$); GDP growth -1 (lagged growth in %); privatization
proceeds (accumulated proceeds as a % of GDP); corruption (PRS ICRG index, ranges from 0 (highly
corrupt) to 6 (not corrupt)); Inflation -1 (lagged inflation in %); bureaucratic quality (PRS ICRG index,
ranges from 0 (low quality) to 4 (high quality)); democracy index (0-10 scale, from less to more demo-
cratic); Unemployment -1 (lagged unemployment in %). Opinions variables: better situation (1=better,
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2=equal, 3=worse); future situation (1=better, 2=equal, 3=worse); left/right (ranges from 0 (extreme
left) to 10 (extreme right); law confidence (1=very high, 2=high, 3=low, 4=very low); trust (1=yes,
0=no); democracy preference (-1=prefers authoritarian regime, 0=indifferent, 1=prefers democracy).
Table 2. Regression of country-year effects on country level variables.
OLS (1) (2)
GNI per capita -0.013 0.000
(0.018) (0.025)
GDP growth -1 0.084 0.087
(0.035)** (0.036)**
Privat. proceeds (106) -6.06 -5.53
(2.23)*** (2.46)**
Corruption 0.008 0.011
(0.080) (0.081)
Bureaucratic quality -0.072
(0.091)
Democracy index -0.005
(0.008)
Constant 0.323 0.395
(0.192)* (0.211)*
Observations 80 80
R-squared 0.19 0.20
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 10%: *; 5%: **; 1%: ***.
Variables coding: See Table 1.
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Table 3. Estimations with aggregate data
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics
Sex -0.621 0.383 -0.549 -0.932
(1.571) (1.325) (1.323) (1.623)
Age -0.011 -0.009 -0.014 -0.010
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012)
Couple 0.125 0.579 -0.348 -0.424
(0.422) (0.387) (0.834) (0.779)
Education respondent -0.105 -0.052 -0.391 -0.333
(0.032)*** (0.026)* (0.278) (0.277)
Education respondent (sq) 0.014 0.006 0.062 0.050
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.038) (0.037)
Employment status
Public sect. employee -1.238 -0.752 0.245 -0.342
(0.484)** (0.390)* (0.879) (0.882)
Private sect. employee 0.350 0.277 1.063 1.141
(0.383) (0.372) (0.451)** (0.531)**
Unemployed -1.084 -0.195 0.071 -0.038
(0.579)* (0.611) (0.724) (1.000)
Retired 1.447 0.441 1.504 0.453
(0.869) (1.084) (1.276) (1.237)
At home -0.389 -0.487 0.264 0.061
(0.374) (0.546) (0.678) (0.656)
Student 1.104 1.706 2.685 2.378
(0.689) (0.598)** (0.641)*** (0.699)***
Asset ownership
Tv -0.658 -0.967 -1.327 -0.734
(0.639) (0.677) (0.482)** (0.889)
Fridge 0.044 0.328 0.092 -0.104
(0.433) (0.475) (0.472) (0.456)
Computer -0.093 -0.117 -0.652 -0.690
(0.403) (0.384) (0.566) (0.651)
Wash -0.252 -0.293 -0.464 -0.406
(0.237) (0.172) (0.247)* (0.350)
Car 0.722 0.051 0.628 1.050
(0.483) (0.421) (0.457) (0.520)*
Secondary house -0.208 0.275 0.088 0.344
(0.674) (0.642) (0.776) (0.758)
Home owner -0.342 0.051 -0.799 -0.909
(0.490) (0.390) (0.571) (0.578)
Access to services
Drinking water -0.351 -0.441 -0.625 -0.813
(0.340) (0.450) (0.598) (0.583)
Hot water 0.255 0.344 0.433 0.229
(0.117)** (0.082)*** (0.137)*** (0.259)
Sewage system 0.028 0.032 -0.100 -0.170
(0.250) (0.201) (0.300) (0.351)
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Table 3.- continued
Country level var.
GNI per capita 0.029 0.097 0.118
(0.031) (0.042)** (0.051)**
GDP growth -1 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006)
Privat. proceeds (106) -4.701 -3.446
(11.157) (12.540)
Corruption -0.012 -0.015
(0.023) (0.033)
Opinions variables
Better situation -0.144
(0.213)
Future situation 0.116
(0.180)
Left/right -0.001
(0.003)
Law confidence -0.012
(0.200)
Trust 0.557
(0.373)
Democracy preference 0.200
(0.098)*
year -0.002 -0.030 -0.021 -0.034
(0.007) (0.008)*** (0.019) (0.034)
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 101 84 63 63
R-squared 0.72 0.87 0.90 0.94
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 10%: *; 5%: **; 1%: ***.
Variables coding: See Table 1.
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Table 4. Pseudo panel fixed effects (defining variables: country, age, sex)
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Demographics
Couple 0.744 1.706 1.719 0.824
(0.231)*** (0.326)*** (0.336)*** (0.326)**
Education respondent -0.055 -0.038 -0.016 -0.021
(0.026)** (0.028) (0.027) (0.029)
Education respondent (sq) 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.003
(0.004)*** (0.004)* (0.004) (0.004)
Employment status
Public sect. employee -2.109 -2.880 -1.908 -2.631
(0.343)*** (0.425)*** (0.507)*** (0.419)***
Private sect. employee 0.881 0.377 0.662 0.780
(0.196)*** (0.231) (0.239)*** (0.256)***
Unemployed -0.676 -0.389 -0.637 0.178
(0.293)** (0.416) (0.415)** (0.417)
Retired 0.424 -1.413 -1.102 -1.838
(0.509) (0.557)** (0.534)** (0.543)***
At home -1.397 -2.007 -1.720 -1.505
(0.220)*** (0.320)*** (0.353)*** (0.302)***
Student 2.163 2.653 -2.395 2.640
(0.378)*** (0.441)*** (0.479)*** (0.424)***
Asset ownership
Tv -0.337 -0.221 0.149 -0.187
(0.137)** (0.159) (0.155) (0.144)
Fridge -0.063 -0.162 -0.154 -0.192
(0.112) (0.115) (0.118) (0.113)*
Computer 0.193 0.021 0.049 0.006
(0.130) (0.134) (0.132) (0.127)
Wash -0.299 -0.194 -0.171 -0.132
(0.104)*** (0.098)** (0.101)* (0.100)
Car 0.144 0.114 0.167 0.175
(0.117) (0.121) (0.118) (0.119)
Secondary house 0.183 0.282 0.315 0.208
(0.152) (0.161)* (0.159)** (0.150)
Home owner -0.060 -0.054 -0.093 -0.098
(0.101) (0.114) (0.120) (0.108)
Access to services
Drinking water -0.650 -0.498 -0.448 -0.512
(0.124)*** (0.143)*** (0.147)*** (0.133)***
Hot water 0.168 0.272 0.219 0.153
(0.070)** (0.082)*** (0.095)** (0.085)*
Sewage system 0.125 -0.041 0.035 0.098
(0.076) (0.089) (0.086) (0.089)
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Table 4.- continued
Country level var.
GNI per capita 0.165 0.149 0.118
(0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)***
GDP growth -1 -0.009 -0.009 -0.003
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)
Privat. proceeds 4.118 7.720 3.592
(2.986) (3.982)* (2.808)
Corruption 0.035 0.031 -0.006
(0.013)*** (0.014)** (0.013)
Bureaucratic quality -0.284
(0.069)***
Democracy index -0.001
(0.000)**
Opinions variables
Better situation -0.210
(0.044)***
Future situation 0.080
(0.039)**
Left/right -0.022
(0.012)*
Law confidence -0.086
(0.087)
Trust -0.245
(0.042)***
Democracy preference 0.359
(0.169)**
Year 2000 -0.161 -0.232 -0.300 -0.185
(0.020)*** (0.024)*** (0.036)*** (0.028)***
Year 2001 -0.252 -0.333 -0.311 -0.293
(0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)***
Year 2002 -0.214 -0.292 -0.220 -0.244
(0.022)*** (0.028)*** (0.055)*** (0.028)***
Year 2003 -0.412 -0.509 -0.487 -0.411
(0.024)*** (0.030)*** (0.051)*** (0.035)***
Year 2005 -0.173 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.026)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1414 1106 714 1106
Number of identi 238 224 224 224
R-squared 0.58 0.66 0.79 0.70
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the country level). Coefficients significant
at 10%: *; 5%: **; 1%: ***. Variables coding: See Table 1.
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Table 6. Pseudo panel fixed effects (defining variables: Column 1-2: country,
age, sex; Column 3-4: country, age, sex, left/right)
Probit (1) (2) (3)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Demographics
Couple -0.356 -3.473 -0.936
(1.245) (2.224) (1.125)
Education respondent -0.139 -0.211 -0.137
(0.088) (0.481) (0.079)*
Education respondent (sq) 0.017 0.024 -0.021
(0.011) (0.060) (0.009)**
Employment status
Public sect. employee -1.892 -6.641 -1.866
(1.375) (2.922)** (2.804)
Private sect. employee 1.599 -3.603 -0.229
(0.906)* (2.070)* (2.601)
Unemployed 1.459 0.663 0.691
(2.231) (5.060) (2.701)
Retired -1.893 -2.770 -3.940
(1.065)* (1.778) (1.178)***
At home -0.865 -2.811 -1.372
(0.672) (1.444)* (1.460)
Student 2.224 0.493 1.813
(0.685)*** (3.867) (1.228)
Asset ownership
Tv -0.157 -0.961 -0.008
(0.226) (0.632) (0.044)
Fridge -0.008 0.429 0.033
(0.361) (0.412) (0.046)
Computer 0.341 1.587 0.023
(0.239) (0.692)** (0.042)
Wash -0.020 -0.668 0.023
(0.290) (0.556) (0.061)
Car -0.422 0.041 -0.047
(0.230)* (0.386) (0.033)
Secondary house -0.330 -0.639 -0.063
(0.209) (0.524) (0.060)
Home owner 0.323 0.495 0.036
(0.158)** (0.372) (0.030)
Access to services
Drinking water 0.704 0.595 0.119
(0.205)*** (0.488) (0.046)***
Hot water 0.066 -0.626 -0.086
(0.362) (0.580) (0.053)
Sewage system 0.078 0.139 -0.009
(0.163) (0.684) (0.040)
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Table 6. - continued
Country level var. (1) (2) (3)
GNI per capita 0.124 -0.103 0.000
(0.149) (0.145) (0.000)
GDP growth -1 -0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Privat. proceeds 2.285 15.782 2.980
(6.528) (18.921) (10.247)
Corruption -0.061 -0.043 -0.058
(0.100 (0.141) (0.105)
Opinions variables
Better situation -0.793 -2.005 0.217
(0.450)* (1.581) (0.536)
Future situation 0.509 1.413 -0.186
(0.426) (0.844)* (0.435)
Left/right -0.085 -0.095
(0.037)** (0.321)
Law confidence -0.038 -0.041 -0.067
(0.306) (1.225) (0.056)
Trust 1.433 -6.770 -1.740
(1.245) (3.484)* (3.566)
Democracy preference -0.555 -3.529 -2.230
(0.531) (2.235) (1.125)**
Year 2000 -0.109 -0.513 -0.315
(0.107) (0.332) (0.251)
Year 2001 -0.329 -1.053 -0.661
(0.103)*** (0.396)*** (0.260)**
Year 2002 -0.257 -0.390 -0.350
(0.094)*** (0.263) (0.046)***
Year 2003 -0.511 -0.960 —0.675
(0.1534)*** (0.534)* (0.157)***
Observations 1106 1106 9598
Number of groups 224 224 2173
Sargan test of overidentification (df) 2.606(2) 0.096(2) 0.111(2)
Instruments:
(1) interactions between year dummies and lagged values of left_right and law confidence.
(2) interactions between year dummies and beginning of the period perceptions on the impact of
drugs in society and the impact of work for success
(3) interactions between year dummies and lagged values of law confidence, as well as beginning
of the period perceptions on the impact of drugs in society.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the country level). Coefficients significant at
10%: *; 5%: **; 1%: ***. Variables coding: See Table 1.
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